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A B S T R A C T
Being able to separate temporary global macroeconomic inﬂuences – caused by ﬂuctuations in exchange rates,
interest rates and inﬂation – from intrinsic performance – related to a superior product, production process or
management – is crucial to assessing the development of a ﬁrm’s competiveness. Against that background, this
paper analyzes institutions’ role in making ﬁrms supply outside shareholders with relevant information corre-
sponding to satisfactory transparency from the shareholder perspective. Based on a sample of the 100 largest
public European ﬁrms, it is found that no ﬁrm provided information to a level deemed satisfactory by the outside
shareholder. One explanation may be that optimal transparency for the ﬁrm does not equal satisfactory trans-
parency for the outside shareholder. However, the implementation of IFRS/IAS 1 in the EU as of 2005 and a
company’s international cross-listing activities exhibit associations with a better supply of information and a
narrowing of the gap. Shareholders in the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system are provided with more
relevant information than those in other corporate governance systems. The paper adds to the literature on the
role of institutions in international corporate governance, with a particular focus on information asymmetries in
an international business context.
1. Introduction
To support most corporate decision-making, the decision-maker
needs to understand what share of the proﬁts (or a corporate perfor-
mance measure in general) reﬂects a superior product, production
process and/or management (i.e. the intrinsic competitive edge of the
ﬁrm) and what share reﬂects a temporary eﬀect of macroeconomic
variables, that is, exchange rates, interest rates and inﬂation rates.
Knowledge about the development of the former share (intrinsic
proﬁts) is the basis for corporate decisions to invest/divest, increase
wages, pay out bonuses, determine an adequate dividend, and hire and
ﬁre employees. This knowledge is also of importance to the decision-
making of outside stakeholders like e.g. to shareholders who would like
to know if proﬁts are sustainable before investing or for bankers who
want to know if the deemed capacity of borrowers in servicing loans is
sustainable when granting them loans.
The data needed to measure and comprehend the share of proﬁts
generated (beyond management’s control) by a beneﬁcial macro-
economic development (tailwind) or reduced by an adverse macro-
economic development (headwind) are, however, seldom shared in an
appropriate way with external stakeholders, and these stakeholders
cannot compile this information themselves. The deviation of the ﬁrm’s
supply of information from what is seen as satisfactory by the stake-
holder (from here on, the shareholder) is the focus of this paper. The
paper addresses institutional factors inﬂuencing the gap between the
information supplied by the ﬁrm and the information the shareholder
needs to evaluate – as an input into his/her investment decision – how
the intrinsic competitive edge of the ﬁrm has developed.
The paper recognizes the existence of an information asymmetry,
which is also the building block of the concept of transparency
(Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2015). The asymmetry is between a sender
(the ﬁrm) and a receiver (the stakeholders of the ﬁrm) of information.
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Optimal corporate supply of information (optimal transparency from the
ﬁrm’s perspective) is where the ﬁrm meets the shareholder’s demand
for information in the mutual interest of providing the ﬁrm with the
best economic prospects. Included in the “mutual interest” is a risk
premium charged as compensation by the outsider shareholder for
having to accept a less than satisfactory information release (where
satisfactory transparency means the threshold of information needed by
the shareholder to comprehend the development of the intrinsic
proﬁts).1
In addition to ﬁrm-speciﬁc eﬀects, unsatisfactory transparency may
materialize at the societal level in a higher aggregate cost of capital
(Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2006; Lambert, Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2007) that
decreases investment rates and decelerates national economic growth.
Hence, incentives do exist at a national or regional level to encourage
ﬁrms to increase transparency to a satisfactory level in order to help
outsider shareholders make proper judgments about corporate compe-
tiveness, even if there may be proprietary costs involved (e.g., Dye,
1985; Leuz, 2004; Lang & Sul, 2014). In a policy context, this ambition
may be achieved via the design of accounting rules and corporate
governance standards.
The research question addressed in this paper concerns the role
played by institutional forces in minimizing the gap between optimal
and satisfactory transparency with respect to the eﬀects of macro-
economic ﬂuctuations on corporate competitiveness. In determining the
demand side of information and what is seen as “satisfactory” trans-
parency by the shareholders, the analysis follows the approach2 out-
lined in Oxelheim and Wihlborg (2008). In a normative way, their
approach is used to identify the ﬂoor as regards the shareholders’ need
for information to enable a ﬁltering out of the eﬀects of a macro-
economic tail- or headwind from reported proﬁts with the aim of un-
derstanding the development of a ﬁrm’s competitiveness.
On the supply side of information, methods used to measure and
report the eﬀects of changes in the macroeconomic environment are, in
the literature as well as in practice, found to be both puzzlingly partial
and static in scope (Oxelheim, Wihlborg, & Thorsheim, 2012a,b). They
are partial in the sense that deeply rooted theoretical relationships
among exchange rates, interest rates and inﬂation rates are not fully
recognized. The interdependence between these variables is not ac-
counted for, even though prior research has established that they may
be highly correlated (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2003). Moreover, volume
eﬀects from changes in macroeconomic variables are ignored on the
supply side of information, and so too are the eﬀects of interest rate
changes on the demand for a ﬁrm’s products and services, hence pro-
viding the shareholder with only a partial picture of the proﬁt devel-
opment (Oxelheim & Wihlborg, 2008).3 Finally, a supply of information
that will be seen as satisfactory from the shareholders’ point of view has
to capture eﬀects not explicitly visible from the existence of a particular
foreign currency denomination in the books of the ﬁrm, and has to
reﬂect that a ﬁrm may be outcompeted in its home market by a foreign
competitor subsidized by the overvaluation of the ﬁrm’s home cur-
rency.
For the supply side of information, three potential institutional
sources of importance are considered. First, international institutional
inﬂuences (here International Financial Reporting Standards; IFRS) are
assumed to express themselves via the narrowing of the quantity and
relevance of the supply of information to the demand deemed sa-
tisfactory by shareholders. The institutional pressure may, for instance,
reduce the gap between the demand and supply of information by
eliminating or reducing the information held back as part of the man-
agement’s carrier signaling or eﬀorts to boost compensation (Ferri &
Maber, 2013). Second, accounting rules and national institutional
pressure from the corporate governance system in the location in which
a ﬁrm is headquartered and, third, the indirect international institu-
tional pressure (or transmission of governance practice) via interna-
tional cross-listing are expected to inﬂuence the gap between the in-
formation supplied by the ﬁrm and what is deemed satisfactory by the
outside shareholder.
Based on a sample of the 100 largest public European ﬁrms (see
Appendix A) for the period 2000–2009, the analysis points to a drift in
the supply of information towards what is here claimed to be a sa-
tisfactory level of transparency. The result in terms of a diminishing
transparency gap suggests that strengthened inﬂuence from institu-
tional factors may substitute for mandatory rules, thereby allowing
some ﬁrms to avoid big costs that should have accrued to them if all
ﬁrms were forced to provide transparency that is satisfactory for the
shareholder, though not optimal for the ﬁrm. However, the results also
indicate that none of the 100 analyzed companies supplied information
that would allow the outside shareholders to fully comprehend the
development of intrinsic performance and, hence, any potential change
in competitiveness. The IAS1/IFRS, as of 2005 (with promulgation
phase and implementation), with its recommendations regarding mac-
roeconomic information, is found to have contributed towards nar-
rowing the transparency gap. Such a contribution is also found for the
Anglo-Saxon and Nordic corporate governance regimes, as well as for
international cross-listing. Optimal transparency for a ﬁrm may well
mean supplying a level and quality of information below that seen as
representing satisfactory transparency. However, with all the studied
ﬁrms supplying less information than seen as satisfactory, further
support from institutional factors to narrow the transparency gap may
be called for
This paper adds to the principal-agent literature by addressing the
role of institutions in international corporate governance. It does so
with a focus on information asymmetries and risk premia in the inter-
national business context. It provides a new angle on the stream of
research that examines the supply of information in relation to corpo-
rate governance systems (Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Daske, Hail, Leuz, &
Verdi, 2008; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Further, the ﬁndings add
a new aspect to Khanna, Palepu, and Srinivasan (2004) in terms of the
role of international cross-listing in narrowing the transparency gap in
the case of macroeconomic inﬂuences on corporate performance. In the
very context of optimal and satisfactory transparency, the paper adds to
the literature on voluntary disclosure (Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000),
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the theory of proprietary
costs (Dye, 1985; Lang & Sul, 2014) and the disclosure of segment in-
formation (Berger & Hann, 2007).
The article is structured as follows. In Section 2, the theoretical
frameworks and empirical evidence on transparency from market and
ﬁrm perspectives are discussed, as well as the concept of optimal
transparency. The hypotheses are also developed in this section. Section
3 highlights previous research on the supply of information regarding
the macroeconomic impact on the proﬁts of a ﬁrm. Here, the devel-
opment and implications of IFRS (in particular IAS 1) are discussed. In
1 For instance, a ﬁrm may consider some information to be proprietary (e.g. Leuz &
Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia, 2001; Berger & Hann, 2007; Lambert et al., 2007) and the
option of not revealing it an expression of optimal transparency with the ambition to e.g.
foster innovation and productivity (Bernstein, 2014). However, what is seen as optimal
for the ﬁrm may be seen as unsatisfactory transparency by the shareholders, preventing
them from understanding intrinsic performance. The shareholders will react to this by
charging a risk premium for the deviation between optimal and satisfactory transparency
that will increase the ﬁrm’s cost of capital (e.g. Merton, 1987; Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000;
Verrecchia, 2001; Lambert et al., 2007; Daske et al., 2008).
2 It consists of three pillars: (1) fundamental analysis to identify the set of macro-
economic variables (within the categories of exchange rates, interest rates and inﬂation
rates) with potential explanatory power for variations in corporate proﬁts, (2) multi-
variate analysis to sort out which variables have high explanatory power and should be
considered, and ﬁnally, (3) formulating a strategy to handle the eﬀects of the macro-
economic variables found to have high explanatory power.
3 It is hard to ﬁnd any ﬁrm that is not impacted by what is happening on the global
economic arena. However, the impact diﬀers from ﬁrm to ﬁrm. Some ﬁrms may be ex-
posed to a very small eﬀect but the shareholders of these ﬁrms still need to be explicitly
informed about the magnitude through the information supplied by the ﬁrm. A reluctance
to provide information will cause the shareholder to charge a risk premium for not
knowing the diﬀerence between pure reluctance and a small impact.
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the next section, a comprehensive approach allowing ﬁrms to be
transparent on the role of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, the Macro-
economic Uncertainty Strategy (MUST) model, is discussed. The MUST
approach allows a ﬁrm to identify, measure, manage and report mac-
roeconomic impacts on its proﬁts. The model is used to show how
macroeconomic information may be extracted to provide information
seen as satisfactory by the external shareholder. In Section 5, the data,
variables, methodology and descriptive results are presented, followed
by the main results in Section 6 and conclusions in Section 7.
2. Theory and hypotheses
Both theoretical and empirical research make a distinction between
ﬁrm-speciﬁc motives for transparency and motives in an overall market
perspective. From an individual ﬁrm’s perspective, optimal transpar-
ency corresponds to the “degree of supply of information” that yields
the greatest net beneﬁts, that is, maximizes ﬁrm value. However, in-
dividual ﬁrms may not account for all costs, which on an aggregate
market level can lead to suboptimal outcomes and make regulators and
law makers intervene.
2.1. Market-related eﬀects of the corporate supply of information
The eﬀects of the supply of information may go beyond the eﬀects
on a speciﬁc ﬁrm and appear as a market-related eﬀect, inﬂuencing
competitors as well as other ﬁrms, industries or the entire economy of a
region or country. When information is revealed, for example regarding
consumer trends or detailed proﬁt per business sector, other ﬁrms can
beneﬁt from reduced information asymmetries. This is an example of an
externality that has been examined theoretically, with a suggested link
between liquidity and information, as well as between the aggregate
cost of capital and the supply of information (Dye, 1990; Lambert et al.,
2007; Admati & Pﬂeiderer, 2000). The external eﬀects of ﬁnancial re-
porting have also been recognized in the empirical literature; Foster
(1981) shows that earnings announcements supply investors with in-
formation about other ﬁrms in the industry. However, externalities
work both ways and Sadka (2006) demonstrates that misreporting has
spillover eﬀects onto incumbents in the same industry, which indicates
not only the importance of having adequate reporting rules in place but
also the value of an institutional infrastructure to enforce these prop-
erly.
2.2. Firm-speciﬁc eﬀects of the supply of information
Theoretical research mainly focuses on liquidity and cost of capital
in examining the eﬀects of the corporate supply of information
(Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2006). If ﬁnancial reporting is inadequate
then market liquidity should be reduced due to information asymmetry
and adverse selection, and investors will demand higher returns on
their investments. The eﬀect on liquidity stemming from the supply of
information is well documented in the empirical research. Leuz and
Verrecchia (2000) show that ﬁrms voluntarily changing from German
GAAP to IAS (or US GAAP) have larger trading volumes and smaller
bid-ask spreads (see also Welker, 1995; Healy, Hutton, Palepu, 1999).
This also includes an eﬀect of an early commitment to more transpar-
ency, and supports the theoretical arguments in Verrecchia (2001), who
argues that an increase in corporate information supply may alleviate
liquidity issues and increase ﬁrm value.
In addition to an indirect link between cost of capital and liquidity,
Lambert et al. (2007) show a direct link between the cost of capital and
the supply of information, by examining estimation risk in a theoretical
model. They ﬁnd that the supply of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information aﬀects the
assessed cash-ﬂow covariance between ﬁrms; hence, there is a non-di-
versiﬁable cost-of-capital eﬀect. They also show that the supply of in-
formation aﬀects real decisions and future expected cash ﬂows. The
presence of information asymmetries and adverse selection aﬀect
capital allocation decisions through the cost of capital (see also Myers &
Majluf, 1984; Baiman & Verrecchia, 1996). Due to a higher cost of
capital, investment opportunities may be foregone. Empirical research
supports the theory on this matter. Frankel, McNichols, and Wilson,
1995 ﬁnd a positive relationship between external ﬁnancing and the
supply of information.4 A study investigating the cost of capital in an
IFRS environment (mandatory disclosure, as compared to re-
commendations only) is provided by Daske et al. (2008). They ﬁnd a
decrease in the cost of capital as a result of the implementation of IFRS,
when they include early adopters. The outcomes of other studies on the
adoption of plain recommendations are less conclusive regarding the
link between the corporate supply of information and the cost of capital
(e.g., Botosan, 1997; Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Cuijpers & Buijink,
2005; Daske, 2006; Banghöj & Plenborg, 2008; Hussainey & Walker,
2009; Lang & Maﬀett, 2011). The inconclusiveness may be explained by
a vague deﬁnition of the demand for relevant information.
There are costs attached to the supply of information and they can
be divided into direct and indirect costs. The components that make up
the direct costs are rather easy to identify. Examples of typical direct
costs are labor costs, rents and costs of information systems. The most
evident indirect cost, often hard to estimate, is the cost of revealing
proprietary information that competitors will be able to use to their
advantage (Verrecchia, 2001). Leuz (2004), for example, studies a
sample of German ﬁrms and ﬁnds that the probability of information
disclosure is lower when a ﬁrm’s market segment has higher proﬁt-
ability. Hence, proprietary costs seem to be present. Diﬀerences in
proprietary costs are, in Oxelheim (2003), expected to appear as a
diﬀerence in the supply of information between companies with
homogeneous and companies with heterogeneous products. However,
the study ﬁnds no signiﬁcant diﬀerences of that kind.
2.3. Optimal transparency
A high level of transparency is not synonymous with publishing as
much information as possible, but rather with presenting fair and useful
information that assists outsiders with making well-informed forecasts
of future performance and the sustainability of competitiveness. In
other words, there is a “satisfactory” demand for information from
outside shareholders that companies must consider in their supply of
information. Drowning outsiders in information is more confusing than
helpful and ﬁrms must be heedful of the fact that additional informa-
tion is not the same as enhanced information quality (Forssbaeck &
Oxelheim, 2015; Morris & Shin, 2002). Producing and supplying in-
formation comes at a cost to the ﬁrm, whereas a cost of digestion for the
shareholder must also be considered in determining what can be la-
beled optimal transparency. The trade-oﬀ between the costs and ben-
eﬁts of the supply of information builds on three strands of literature:
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the theory of proprietary
costs (see, e.g., Dye, 1985; Lang & Sul, 2014) and the disclosure of
segment information (Berger & Hann, 2007).
In addition to the risk of supplying too much information, a central
aspect that may make the transparency deviate from the satisfactory
level without being optimal for the ﬁrm is found in the CEO’s own in-
centive structure. From his or her point of view, there may be good
reasons to hold back detailed macroeconomic-related information from
the public, while this information may be a vital component from an
investor’s point of view. For example, Chiu, Oxelheim, Wihlborg, and
Zhang (2016) for US ﬁrms and Oxelheim et al. (2012a,b) for Swedish
ﬁrms report a large part of CEO compensation to be attributed to
macroeconomic ﬂuctuations, which implicitly suggests that managers
are compensated for performance beyond their control. Without an
adequate supply of information regarding the role played by
4 See also Ozkan et al. (2012) reporting higher earnings quality and greater earnings
comparability brought by the mandatory adoption of IFRS.
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macroeconomic variables in proﬁt development, CEOs will – in a setting
of asymmetric remuneration systems – be tempted for personal reasons
to have more open macroeconomic exposure than is optimal for the
ﬁrm. The lack of disclosure will pave the way for moral hazard and
excessive risk taking. Since the management controls the information
supply, it is important to analyze – as is done in this study – the role
institutional pressure on the ﬁrm has in increasing the quality of
macroeconomic information disclosed, so as to protect shareholder.
2.4. Institutional inﬂuences on the transparency gap – the hypotheses
The implementation of IFRS as of 2005 for public European ﬁrms
was an attempt to increase transparency but in a voluntary way, as a
mere recommendation regarding the information to be supplied on the
role of the macroeconomic impact on performance.5 The analysis here
includes this dimension as the ﬁrst institutional inﬂuence on the
transparency gap, though the results of previous studies covering the
adoption of recommended reporting rules and the eﬀects of the supply
of information are not uniform (e.g., Leuz & Verrecchia, 2000; Cuijpers
& Buijink, 2005; Daske, 2006; Kim, Tsui, & Yi, 2011). During the period
of study, IAS 1 – which outlines standards for presenting ﬁnancial
statements – was modiﬁed several times (Gray & Kang, 2015), and this
is considered in the analysis.
However, to what extent is a set of uniform reporting standards –
when adopted in a voluntary fashion in several diﬀerent countries with
distinguishing characteristics – enough to achieve high-quality dis-
closure of the impact of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations on corporate
proﬁts? There are reasons to believe that recommendations on dis-
closure requirements are not going to improve the information quality
unless the compliance is monitored and enforcement regimes are at
work (Elliot, Krische, & Peecher, 2010). The fact that IFRS is a princi-
ples-based framework, and includes room for interpretation,
strengthens the importance of supporting institutions and other cor-
porate governance mechanisms in upholding the quality of reporting
(Brüggemann, Hitz, & Sellhorn, 2013; Verrecchia, 2001). The two ad-
ditional institutional dimensions considered in the analysis may be seen
as complementary to the relative success of the IFRS recommendations.
The point of departure for the ﬁrst hypothesis tested is that the
recommendation6 of IAS 1 (1997) via IFRS (2005) – to ﬁrms to disclose
the magnitude of the eﬀects of volatile macro-prices (exchange rates,
interest rates and inﬂation rates) in their external reporting in one way
or another – should have contributed to improved quality of informa-
tion on the impact of ﬁrm-speciﬁc macroeconomic factors on proﬁts
(see, e.g., Verrecchia, 2001; Brüggemann et al., 2013 on voluntary
disclosure). From a longitudinal perspective, early adoption indicates a
commitment to an increased supply of relevant information and a
narrowing to the level of satisfactory transparency for the shareholder
(in line with ﬁndings from Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). The develop-
ment of the IFRS indicates that more attention (since IFS rev 1997) is
given to the macroeconomic impact signaling that if ﬁrms do not be-
have, a mandatory reporting of macroeconomic eﬀects may be in the
cards. Hence, the ﬁrst hypothesis tested is:
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive relationship between the
developments of the IAS/IFRS recommendations and the supply of
relevant information on the macroeconomic impact on the proﬁts of the
ﬁrm.
However, accounting standards are not independent of other fac-
tors, and should be understood as one of several determinants of op-
timal transparency. Although the implementation of IFRS has harmo-
nized reporting standards across Europe, other crucial determinants of
the supply of information remain country-speciﬁc, and may be dis-
tinguished as institutional (see, e.g., Jaggy and Low, 2000; Hope, 2003;
Bushman & Piotroski, 2006). As a second institutional inﬂuence on the
transparency gap, the role of a country’s corporate governance system is
included, as a proxy for an additional domestic institutional pressure, as
it has been shown to be positively related to the information supply in
prior studies in other areas (e.g., Forker, 1992; Eng & Mak, 2003; Hope,
2003; Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, & Stolowy, 2007).
The development of institutions, laws, regulations and markets over
time have formed two main corporate governance systems, the Anglo-
Saxon and the Germanic system. The Anglo-Saxon system is char-
acterized by dispersed ownership, separation between ownership and
control, minority shareholder protection, and an equity market having
a central function. The Germanic governance system, on the other
hand, is distinguished by ownership concentration, weak minority
shareholder protection, and control usually exercised by blockholders.
In between these two paradigms is the Nordic corporate governance
model, which is internationally oriented, with high levels of IPO and M
&A activity and a civil law system characterized by higher shareholder
protection than is found in other civil law countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1997; Pagano & Volpin, 2005).
Prior studies have shown a distinct connection between the legal
and institutional environment, and the quality of information supplied
(e.g., Forker, 1992; La Porta et al., 1998; Eng & Mak, 2003; Ding et al.,
2007). La Porta et al. (1998), for example, show that common law
countries have stronger legal protection for investors, while Leuz et al.
(2003) show that enforcement and investor protection laws are im-
portant in the quest for quality of supply of information. Ball et al.
(2003) strengthen this theory by showing that such quality is dependent
on the institutional environment. Daske et al. (2008) ﬁnd that capital-
market-related beneﬁts are only evident in countries with strong in-
stitutional environments. Diﬀerences in enforcement, types of law
systems and institutional environments are found signiﬁcant between
the Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and Nordic systems (Ball et al., 2003; Daske
et al., 2008; La Porta et al., 1998; Leuz et al., 2003).
IFRS is principles-based, with responsibility transferred onto the legal
system and supporting institutions that have the role of enforcing the
standards (Ball, 2006). This emphasizes the importance of complementary
elements in determining the quality of the supply of information. The
“strength” of a corporate governance system is, therefore, determined by
the degree of legal protection and the eﬃciency of institutional super-
vising and enforcement. According to this deﬁnition, the Anglo-Saxon
system is the strongest and the Germanic system the weakest, with the
Nordic system in the middle. This argumentation leads to the second
hypothesis regarding macroeconomic information disclosure:
Hypothesis 2. There is a positive relationship between the strength of a
corporate governance system and the supply of relevant information on
the macroeconomic impact on the proﬁts of the ﬁrm.
As the third potential institutional inﬂuence on the supply of re-
levant information regarding the macroeconomic impact on the proﬁts
of the ﬁrm, the transmission of international institutional pressure is
studied, as proxied by international cross-listing activities. A presence
in foreign capital markets, by means of listing, exposes a ﬁrm to dif-
ferent types of corporate governance systems and international in-
formation environments, which may aﬀect the information supply and
narrow the transparency gap (Kihlstrom, 1974; Lang, Lins, & Miller,
2003; Lang, Smith Raedy, & Wilson, 2006). The marginal cost of pro-
viding the extra information encouraged by greater capital market
pressures should be negligible, and hence result in greater information
supply overall (see Cooke, 1991; Hossain & Adams, 1995).
5 The way voluntary reporting (in this paper regarding the eﬀects of macroeconomic
factors) should be implemented changed between IAS 1 (1997 rev.) and IFRS (2005a).
The reporting of the macroeconomic eﬀects was in the entire period of investigation
voluntary but those ﬁrms that saw the general interest from regulators in transparency -
as signaled by IFRS 2005a - may have started to prepare themselves in the running up to
the implementation of IFRS 2005.
6 In fact, “encouragement” in IAS (1997) or the even weaker alternative “ﬁrms can” in
IFRS (2005a) in accordance with footnote 4.
L. Oxelheim International Business Review 28 (2019) 190–206
193
Besides the enforcement dimension to which strong corporate gov-
ernance systems give rise, an additional source of pressure can be im-
posed by capital markets in general. Information considered as less
relevant in one market may be regarded as a “must” in another, causing
spillover eﬀects. An important vehicle for such spillovers from diﬀerent
corporate governance systems is international cross-listing, which is
synonymous with increased monitoring that may reduce agency costs
by alleviating contracting conﬂicts (Fama & Jensen, 1983). As a result,
cross-listing has a complementary eﬀect on the propensity to supply
relevant information (Baker, Nofsinger, & Weaver, 2002; Lang et al.,
2003, 2006). Empirical evidence supports this notion. Meek and Gray
(1989), for example, ﬁnd that continental European ﬁrms listed on the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) supply more information than is required
by the LSE. Khanna et al. (2004) show a positive relationship between
cross-listing and information supply by analyzing interactions between
a group of ﬁrms and the US capital markets. The arguments discussed
above lead to the third hypothesis to be tested:
Hypothesis 3. There is a positive relationship between international
cross-listing and the supply of relevant information on the
macroeconomic impact on the proﬁts of the ﬁrm.
3. Prior studies of the supply of information regarding the
macroeconomic impact on corporate performance
The relevant macroeconomic environment of the ﬁrm may be for-
mulated in many ways. The guiding principle is to ﬁnd macroeconomic
variables that inﬂuence the corporate performance and which are easy
to measure and more or less instantaneously observable. Deviations
from International Fisher Parity and Purchasing Power Parity generate
excess proﬁt and losses. Based on these two relationships, and with the
requirement of ease of measurement without any delay, the macro-
economic inﬂuences can be measured as channeled through ﬂuctua-
tions in exchange rates, interest rates and inﬂation. The corporate
supply of information on the role played by these three categories of
variables has – as reﬂected in the accounting research and discussed
below – changed over time.
Ever since Bretton Woods and its extension collapsed in 1973, re-
searchers have elaborated on diﬀerent ways of reﬂecting changes in the
macroeconomic environment through accounting practices. In the
1970 s, increasing exchange rate volatility initiated a debate on how
such ﬂuctuations could be disclosed in ﬁnancial reporting. The debate
was primarily concerned with two aspects: (1) methods of evaluating
foreign assets and liabilities and (2) methods that could be applied
when consolidating company accounts. In the 1990 s, the focus was
directed towards ﬁnancial assets and reporting techniques (e.g., SFAS
No. 132, IAS 32 and IAS 39). Overall, accounting rules have focused on
nominal exchange rate changes and how assets, liabilities and cash
ﬂows are converted eﬃciently. Questions over the eﬀects of ﬂuctua-
tions in real exchange rates, and in particular how they aﬀect compe-
titiveness, are still open research issues in 2018.
Research on inﬂation has been approached from two angles in the
accounting literature. The ﬁrst line of research, which was inﬂuential in
the 1970 s, examines the eﬀects of inﬂation within a country (e.g., Ijiri,
1976; Staubus, 1976; Vickrey, 1976). One of the issues studied is
whether to use the general price level or speciﬁc price levels (e.g.,
Rosenfeld, 1972; Sterling, 1975). Furthermore, the choice over whether
to use price index and current cost accounting has attracted attention
(Bromwich, 1975; Staubus, 1975). The second line of research focuses
on the inﬂationary aspect of foreign investments, and inﬂation diﬀer-
entials between countries. These studies are primarily based on Pur-
chasing Power Parity and aim to determine whether accounting stan-
dards capture diﬀerences in inﬂation (e.g., Aliber & Stickney, 1975;
Beaver & Wolfson, 1982). Accounting research has, over time, had a
focus on inﬂation, but the role relative cross-border price changes play
in competitiveness is still an open research issue in 2018.
Interest rate ﬂuctuations can be divided into two broad tracks. The ﬁrst
approach deals with the translation of foreign liabilities (Oxelheim, 1983).
The second track examines the accounting of ﬁnancial instruments (see
IAS 39). Typically, the accounting of interest rate risk is only concerned
with ﬁnancial instruments and ﬁrms, and not performance, in other
words, commercial exposure. For many ﬁrms, especially those selling
luxury products, the interest rate eﬀect on the commercial side is a sub-
stantial determinant of performance (Oxelheim et al., 2012a,b). This
commercial eﬀect is still not recognized in accounting research as of 2018.
In addition to the three macro-price variables mentioned above,
political risk deserves attention. This is seen as the risk of an altered
relationship between the macro-price variables, for instance, in terms of
a new exchange rate regime. The eﬀects of political risk and how it
should be managed within ﬁnancial accounting is still an open issue.
Some studies examine, for example, sudden price changes and sub-
sequent accounting measures (e.g., Watts & Zimmerman, 1986; Han &
Wang, 1998). Although studies show that accounting rules are vehicles
for managing political risk in creative ways, little has been done in
accounting as regards the supply of information on the link between
political risk and corporate performance.
To summarize, the ﬁndings of prior research in the ﬁeld of re-
quirements on the supply of relevant (in the shareholders’ perspective)
information about the eﬀects of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations (in ex-
change rates, interest rates and inﬂation rates, as well as of political
risks) on corporate performance and competitiveness, lack attention to
the interdependence between the macroeconomic variables and require
further elaboration.
4. IAS 1: implications for the supply of relevant information
International regulatory bodies and institutions encourage the dis-
closure of decision-relevant information. Here, IAS 1, Presentation of
Financial Statements, is the main standard of interest. It has been revised
several times in the last 20 years so as to achieve greater transparency.
Signiﬁcant changes of interest to this study took place on 1 July 1998
(ISAC, 1998), 1 January 2005 (IASB, 2005a) and 1 January 2009 (IASB,
2009a). Our study will cover three periods: 2000–2003, 2003–2006 and
2006–2009. The ﬁrst period is assumed to catch the voluntary im-
provements coming out of the IAS 1, the second period to catch the eﬀect
of the announcement that IFRS 2005 was on the table, and, ﬁnally, the
third period is assumed to show the eﬀects on the voluntary supply of
relevant information on the macroeconomic eﬀects on corporate per-
formance as a result of the actual implementation of IFRS 2005.
After 20 years of “silence” concerning IAS 1, which was ﬁrst in-
troduced as IAS 5 in 1977, the changes initiated in 1997, which came
into eﬀect on 1 July 1998, represented a step in the right direction
towards increased transparency about the macroeconomic impact on
corporate proﬁts. The substance of the 1997 revision is relevant to
observations between 2000 and 2003. Below, the content of Paragraph
8 IAS 1 (1998) is given as a basis for its inclusion in the analysis:
Enterprises are encouraged to present, outside of the ﬁnancial
statements, a ﬁnancial review by management which describes and
explains the main features of the enterprise’s ﬁnancial performance and
ﬁnancial position and the principal uncertainties it faces. Such a report
may include a review of:
i the main factors and inﬂuences determining performance, including
changes in the environment in which the enterprise operates, the
enterprise’s response to those changes and their main eﬀect, and the
enterprise’s policy for investment to maintain and enhance perfor-
mance, including its dividend policy;
ii the enterprise’s sources of funding, the policy on gearing and its risk
management policies; and
iii the strength and resources of the enterprise whose value is not re-
ﬂected in the balance sheet under International Accounting
Standards.
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This paragraph made an advance in information disclosure com-
pared to its predecessors. Overall, IFRS (and in particular IAS 1) is a
loose standard that is open to interpretation and, thus, expected to yield
diﬀerent levels of reporting quality in dissimilar settings. For example,
the term “environment” can be assigned diﬀerent meanings. Given that
the macroeconomy has a major impact on ﬁrm performance, this is
equated with the term environment. Factors and inﬂuences are inter-
preted to mean the macroeconomic variables that aﬀect a ﬁrm’s per-
formance in its product, service and ﬁnancial markets. Hence, under
IAS 1 one can expect a speciﬁcation of the macroeconomic variables as
well as of how they inﬂuence the ﬁrm. The exposure of a ﬁrm can be
presented in many ways but it is here argued that the most convenient
measures are sensitivity coeﬃcients.
The term “risk management” is mentioned in part (ii) of the above
paragraph. This will lead to an expected speciﬁcation of the risks that
are being managed, the eﬀects of these risks, the strategic considera-
tions being made now and potential future strategic changes. Moreover,
a breakdown of the types of instruments used to manage these risks and
the net exposure would be anticipated. IAS 1 (IASC, 1998) did not,
however, require uniformity or any quantitative measures of risk ex-
posures.
To sum up, IAS 1 (IASC, 1998) encouraged companies to present an
analysis of the “environment” aﬀecting their performance but there
were no formal quantitative requirements. Companies could get away
with sweeping comments that had no real value for outsiders. Oxelheim
(2003) examines macroeconomic transparency in the global automotive
and paper industries as expressed by IAS 1 (IASC, 1998) and concludes
that the macroeconomic disclosure is not of a satisfactory quality. As a
result, an outsider shareholder/investor would not be able to determine
intrinsic performance based on the information available in the annual
reports and would have to charge a risk premium as compensation for
investing in such ﬁrms with unsatisfactory disclosure.
IAS 1 (IASB, 2005a), like IAS 1 (IASC, 1998), only provides re-
commendations. Compared to Paragraph 8 IAS 1 (IASC, 1998), com-
panies are no longer explicitly “encouraged”. Instead, Paragraph 9 IAS
1 (IASB, 2005a)7 indistinctly points out that some companies present
the type of information discussed above. However, Paragraph 116 was
added to the standard. This speciﬁes that ﬁrms must communicate
details of major assumptions made about the future, and explain
sources of uncertainty that may be relevant to the assets and liabilities.
Paragraphs 117–124 provide further guidance, but also some exemp-
tions. Paragraph 120 is the most important supplement to have been
added at this time, specifying that the information requirements in
Paragraph 116 should be presented in such a way that an outsider
would be able to understand the management’s assessment of the fu-
ture, in particular any information concerning sources of uncertainty
and their potential impact. However, the contribution made by these
additions is vague due to Paragraph 121, which dilutes the information
requirements by not explicitly requiring budget information or fore-
casts.
IFRS 7, Financial Instruments: Disclosure, which came into eﬀect on 1
January 2007 (IASB, 2005b) relates to macroeconomic information
disclosure but not in the context of the ﬁrm’s overall performance and
competitiveness. The standard requires that ﬁrms disclose information
concerning market risks related to ﬁnancial instruments (as do IAS 32
and IAS 39). IFRS 7 demands that ﬁrms explicitly present both quali-
tative and quantitative information regarding any exposures to market
risks arising from ﬁnancial instruments, as well as how these risks occur
and how they are managed. IFRS 7 furthermore requires that companies
report sensitivity coeﬃcients.
What the outside stakeholders demand in order to be able to eval-
uate the actual development of proﬁts as well as future prospects is
information – content and format – that ﬁts into an analysis of What-If
scenarios. However, these requirements are not fully captured by the
recommendations in IFRS; for example, volume eﬀects from interest
rate ﬂuctuations are neglected and the extent to which an exchange rate
appreciation can undermine competitiveness by “subsidizing” foreign
competitors and thus bring the quantities down is not covered. Most
importantly, the developments to IAS 1 and the supporting standards do
not make the disclosure of quantitative measures of macroeconomic
vulnerability an issue. The IFRS may mean one step forward and should
be seen as a complement to the other two institutional forces under
investigation here, regarding the propensity to supply the kind of in-
formation the outside shareholder needs.
5. What is satisfactory transparency for the outsider shareholder?
A matter of great concern is what is deemed by outsider share-
holders as “satisfactory” disclosure of a macroeconomic impact. The
discrepancy between “satisfactory” and “optimal” may then be ex-
plained by the net cost to the ﬁrm of revealing sensitive information on
competitiveness that is exploitable by competitors, on the one hand,
and the eﬀect of the risk premium charged by outsider shareholders for
being kept uninformed, on the other. The Macroeconomic Uncertainty
Strategy (MUST)-analysis (developed by Oxelheim and Wihlborg
(2008), as a management device) is chosen to facilitate interpretations
and to characterize what is “satisfactory” macroeconomic information.
The framework divides proﬁt (or performance in general) into two
components – intrinsic and macroeconomic. In the next section, it is
described how the MUST framework can be utilized to produce ade-
quate macroeconomic information and to act as a platform for identi-
fying the information that should be seen as “satisfactory” by external
shareholders if communicated.
5.1. The components of the MUST analysis
The MUST framework includes three steps in the process of ﬁltering
out the component of performance that is attributable to temporary
macroeconomic eﬀects. The ﬁrst step is to identify macroeconomic
variables with potentially explanatory value. Oxelheim and Wihlborg
(2008) argue that asking a series of questions aimed at identifying the
most central variables is a viable approach: (1) Where does the ﬁrm
produce? (2) From where does it purchase inputs? (3) Which are the
main markets in terms of selling?8 (4) Who are its competitors? (5)
Where do the competitors produce? (6) Where do the competitors
purchase their inputs? (7) Which are the competitors’ main markets in
terms of selling? (8) In which currencies are the company’s liabilities
and assets denominated?
The fundamental analysis will result in a number of exchange rates,
interest rates and inﬂation rates with potential economic explanatory
power. As the second step, the list of variables is narrowed down
through a backward stepwise regression that retains the variables that
explain the majority of the variance in the proﬁt. The backward step-
wise regression will yield the relevant quantitative exposure measures,
taking into account the interrelations between the price variables.9
The third step regards the choice by ﬁrms to adopt exposure
7 A revised version of IAS 1 became eﬀective on 1 January 2009; however, the addi-
tions were minor. Paragraph 8 (1998) and Paragraph 9 (2005) became Paragraph 13,
while 116, 120 and 121 (2005) correspond to 125, 129 and 130 (2009). In a small
change, new rules regarding risk management activities were introduced in IFRS 7 (re-
ferred to in Paragraph 114 IAS 1 (2009)).
8 For example, a Swiss ﬁrm selling in the US may this way identify the CHF/USD as a
variable of potential explanatory value to a proﬁt change.
9 Using multiple regressions can introduce problems. A key argument is that the re-
lationship between the variables may not be linear. An example would be the exercising
of real options, such as relocating production or changing suppliers, which introduce non-
linear relationships. However, Capel (1997) shows that the cost of exercising such op-
tions, at least in the medium term, would be too large and thus the assumption of linearity
is acceptable. Another argument against using them is a potential lack of a series of data
long enough to be used in the analysis. In this case, analogies to other similar ﬁrms would
have to be used until enough data existed.
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strategies as a response to the knowledge about the impact of macro-
economic variables on proﬁt. This step makes it hard for outsider
shareholders to estimate the sensitivity coeﬃcients themselves. To do
this or to fully comprehend the impact of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations
in a particular period, he or she would need to know whether the
management had undertaken any operations (e.g. hedging) that might
have changed the underlying sensitivity.
The information generated by these three steps allows the ﬁrm to
provide the outside stakeholder with a satisfactory macroeconomic
picture, in line with the example of a ﬁctitious company presented in
Table 1.
Assume that the ﬁctitious company in the table is a Swiss-based
company exporting to the US, with a Japanese competitor in that
market. Following application of the ﬁrst two pillars of the MUST
analysis (the fundamental analysis aimed at identifying variables with
potential explanatory value and the multivariate empirical analysis aim
at estimating which variables that actually have an explanatory value
and the size of it), the result regarding what is deemed relevant sa-
tisfactory information to the shareholders of this Swiss-based company
can be found in Table 1. The table shows that the company expects a
four-percentage-point depreciation of the Swiss franc (expressed as
more Swiss franc on a US dollar), with a positive sensitivity coeﬃcient
revealing that a depreciation of the Swiss franc would beneﬁt the ﬁrm
in its export eﬀorts10. The table further reveals (through a negative
sensitivity coeﬃcient) that the assumed interest rate increase in the US
market may absorb demand, and the producer price increase in Japan
will (through a positive sensitivity coeﬃcient) be to the advantage of
the Swiss ﬁrm in its competition with its Japanese competitor. The table
indicates that the ﬁrm can expect a macroeconomic tailwind amounting
to ﬁve percentage points (the sum of the three macroeconomic eﬀects in
the table) of the expected performance improvement. What remains
after the seasonal eﬀect and the expected macroeconomic impact have
been deducted from the forecast is the ﬁrm’s assumption regarding a
four-percentage-point proﬁt increase due to organic growth. Even
without a proﬁt forecast by the ﬁrm, the approach is valid to the ex-
ternal shareholder as a tool in his/her ex-post analysis or in the search
for answers to what-if scenario questions.11 Meeting what shareholder
see as satisfactory (threshold) information should carry no extra data
computing cost for the ﬁrm since this type of calculation should be
highly demanded not least by the board of directors of a ﬁrm.
6. Data, variables, methodology and descriptives
In this section, the methodology is presented under three sub-
headings. Firstly, the data and variables used to analyze determinants
of the supply of macroeconomic information are presented. Secondly,
descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables are
provided. Lastly, the multivariate model is speciﬁed.
6.1. Data
The sample consists of the 100 largest public non-ﬁnancial
European ﬁrms (based on market capitalization measured at the be-
ginning of the period) between 2000 and 200912. The 100 largest public
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms are chosen as these ﬁrms are ﬁnancially un-
constrained, which eliminates the argument that the information is too
costly to produce (Oxelheim et al., 2011). These ﬁrms do also have a
long enough history to make it possible for them to undertake a MUST
analysis (Oxelheim & Wihlborg, 2008). The sample is dispersed over a
wide range of industries and countries; the distribution is presented in
Appendix A. The ﬁrms are studied at four points in time – 2000, 2003,
2006 and 2009 – giving a total of 400 ﬁrm-year observations. The logic
behind the choice of years is based on a desire to study the development
of the information supply after the decision was made to implement
IFRS, before the actual implementation and after the implementation,
as well as capturing voluntary incentives.13
6.2. Dependent variables
There is a high congruence between the output of the MUST analysis
and the demand for information as expressed by IFRS (2005). The de-
pendent variables used in the regressions, as well as to analyze the
development of the supplied information, are deduced from the MUST
analysis and measure macroeconomic information quality. Following
the rationale of the framework, four information categories are dis-
tinguished, which are also the building blocks of what is deemed by the
outsider shareholder to be a satisfactory information supply14: macro-
economic variables, impact, strategies and total (the aggregate construct
for the analysis) (Oxelheim, 2003 and IFRS 2005). The category of
variables named Macroeconomic variables refers to the supply of in-
formation about which macroeconomic variables are relevant for the
individual ﬁrm. Impact refers to the magnitude of the macroeconomic
exposures, that is, the sensitivity coeﬃcients. Strategies refers to the risk
management strategies aﬀecting the sensitivity to the macroeconomic
variables. In addition to the three information categories, total is ana-
lyzed as a fourth dependent variable in order to highlight the overall
Table 1
Example of an information release deemed satisfactory by external share-
holders. Basic information: The ﬁrm forecasts proﬁt to change from this quarter
to the next by 12%. Seasonal pattern indicates a 3-percentage-point improve-
ment to be expected this quarter. No hedging activities are undertaken in the
period.
Macroeconomic
variables
Assumptions
underlying the
forecast (%)
Sensitivity
coeﬃcients from the
MUST-analysis (%)
Macroeconomic
inﬂuence
CHF/USD 4 2 8
US short-term
interest rate
2 −3 −6
Japanese producer
price inﬂation
1 3 3
Note: We here assume that the company is Swiss-based just to exemplify the
approach! In column 1 we have the company’s assumptions that the Swiss Franc
(CHF) vs the US dollar (USD) will depreciate 4% (more CHF on a USD), US
short-term interest rate increases 2% and Japanese producer prices increase
1%. In column 2 we assume that the company has ran an analysis following the
MUST-analysis and ended up with the sensitivity coeﬃcients presented in the
table. We can here see that a one percent increase in the US short-term interest
rate is estimated to give a three percent decrease in proﬁts. The combination of
column 1 and 2 helps the external shareholder to estimate how much help the
company expects from the macroeconomic environment during the quarter: 8
percent from the exchange rate (CHF/USD) and 3 percent from the Japanese
inﬂation. However, the ﬁrm does also expect an adverse eﬀect from the US
short term interest rate of minus 6 percent. Adding the three ﬁgures, we ﬁnd an
expected net impact from the macroeconomic environment of 5 percent; i.e. the
shareholder can expect the company to enjoy a macroeconomic tailwind.
10 It also captures that a depreciation of the Swiss franc would make it harder for
foreign competitors to compete with the focal ﬁrm in its home market.
11 If the outsider shareholder has his/her own what-if scenario the building blocs are
now available to calculate the expected impact. Assume that according to the scenario the
Swiss franc is expected to be unchanged, the US short term interest rate expected to
increase by three percent and the Japanese producer price expected to remain unchanged.
The macroeconomic impact under this scenario is expected to be minus 9 percent, i.e. the
company is expected to experience a macroeconomic headwind.
12 All 100 companies chosen at the beginning of the period are present for the entire
period under investigation.
13 In the multivariate analysis, 22 observations are excluded due to missing data, solely
related to missing observations on foreign sales. The missing observations seem – after
close investigation – to be random and should not bias the results.
14 See also Table 1.
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quality of disclosure in a joint measure. It is the equally weighted
average of the three other categories. Although the analysis is focused
on total, all four dependent variables are included in the analysis in
order to control for potential weighting problems that may arise.
The macroeconomic information provided in each observation is
collected from annual reports and graded from 1 to 4 (Oxelheim, 2003).
Information included should be given directly by the CEO, in the text or
notes, and require no further processing or need for the reader to
combine sources. The deﬁnitions for each grading are based on the
discussion of IAS 1 in Section 3, and the MUST analysis. Admittedly, the
classiﬁcation involves some element of discretion. The ﬁrst and second
grades are non-quantitative, while the third and fourth are of a quan-
titative character:
• Non-quantitative response 1: No speciﬁcation of macroeconomic
variables, the magnitude of their inﬂuence, or strategies for mana-
ging them.
• Non-quantitative response 2: The variables, the magnitude of their
inﬂuence and the strategies are given in general terms but without
detailed speciﬁcation. Typical explanations are “the gross margin
has been negatively aﬀected by exchange rate ﬂuctuations” or “fa-
vorable interest rates have inﬂuenced the net income positively”.
• Quantitative response 1: The disclosure of some, but not all, in-
formation about the most signiﬁcant macroeconomic variables, the
magnitude of their inﬂuence, and the appropriate strategies for
managing these variables. This sort of response is a step in the right
direction. However, if only one coeﬃcient is given, then the variable
should be estimated by taking into account its relationship to other
relevant variables that are not given. Moreover, if there is more than
one relevant (unreported) variable, then the information provided
under this alternative is insuﬃcient as a basis for ﬁltering out the
noise of historical proﬁts and assessing the true performance pro-
spects of the company.
• Quantitative response 2: The most satisfactory response is a complete
speciﬁcation of signiﬁcant macroeconomic variables, the sensitivity
coeﬃcients for these variables estimated using a multivariate fra-
mework, and the strategies for managing ﬂuctuations in these
variables in the past and in the future. This type of information
release is congruent with the information output of a MUST ana-
lysis.15
6.3. Explanatory variables
To test the hypotheses formed in Section 2, three explanatory
variables are used. The institutional factors that, according to the hy-
potheses, may aﬀect the ﬁrm in its supply of information regarding the
macroeconomic inﬂuences on its proﬁts are the development of IFRS
(Hypothesis 1), corporate governance systems (Hypothesis 2) and inter-
national cross-listing (Hypothesis 3).
The development of IFRS as regards recommendations about mac-
roeconomic information disclosure is captured by dummy variables.
The implementation occurred in January 2005. 2000 is used as the base
case and dummies are used to catch the eﬀects of diﬀerent stages: the
eﬀect of 2003 (recommendation decided upon), 2006 (recommendation
implemented) and 2009 (recommendation reﬁned). By using three
dummy variables instead of one, the “early adopters” are captured as
well (Brüggemann et al., 2013). The coeﬃcients of the dummies that
represent the time period after the introduction of IFRS, 2006 and 2009,
are expected to be signiﬁcantly positive, and those from before the
implementation, 2000 and 2003, to be insigniﬁcant.
In accordance with the second hypothesis and the discussion of
Section 2.4, the Anglo-Saxon governance system is expected to have the
greatest impact, and the Germanic system the least impact, on
disclosure quality. Two dummy variables are used to capture the eﬀect
of the corporate governance system. The dummy variables are based on
the location of a ﬁrm’s headquarters (see Appendix A). In the ﬁrst
dummy variable, Anglo-Saxon governance systems (ANG) are assigned
a 1 and others a 0. In the second, Nordic governance systems (NOR) are
assigned a 1 and others a 0. The Germanic governance system (GER) is
the base case in the regression.
The third explanatory variable, international cross-listing, is mea-
sured as the total number of stock exchanges on which a company’s
shares are listed, and is collected from Osiris (CAP)16. Prior studies have
found the quality of the supply of information to be positively related to
cross-listing activities (see Meek & Gray, 1989; Khanna et al., 2004).
These ﬁndings are here (in accordance with Hypothesis 3) extended to
the case of the corporate supply of macroeconomic information, from
the perspective of what is deemed by the outside shareholder as sa-
tisfactory in terms of allowing him/her to comprehend the development
of corporate competitiveness.
6.4. Control variables
A set of ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variables are included, comprising
variables commonly used in prior studies and well-anchored in the
traditional corporate ﬁnance and accounting literature as capturing
known ﬁrm characteristics that aﬀect corporate information supply:
product type, size, leverage, foreign sales, proﬁtability, capital intensity
and stock turnover. Yearly dummy variables are used to capture the
time-series eﬀects. All control variables are taken from Thomson
Reuters Datastream.
In previous empirical studies, several ﬁrm-speciﬁc determinants
have been investigated in relation to information disclosure practices
(e.g., Depoers, 2000; Eng & Mak, 2003; Leuz, 2004). An important as-
pect of a ﬁrm’s strategy, and in particular of information disclosure, is
the type of product. In the analysis, a separation between homogeneous
and heterogeneous products is undertaken, though Oxelheim (2003)
ﬁnds no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in propensity to report between the two
groups. However, the propensity may have changed, and ﬁrms with
more diﬀerentiated products (e.g. media, retail and capital goods) may
be more prone to supply information regarding their macroeconomic
environment, since they can pass on the costs, while ﬁrms with
homogeneous products (e.g. oil and gas, materials and utilities) cannot
do this to the same extent. A dummy variable (PROD) is included for the
type of product a ﬁrm markets: 1 stands for heterogeneous products and
0 for homogeneous. A positive coeﬃcient is expected.
Firm size (SIZE) is a commonly used variable when studying cor-
porate disclosure, and a positive relationship between ﬁrm size and
corporate disclosure is usually found (see Hossain, Perera, & Rahman,
1995; Depoers, 2000; Leuz, 2004). Producing information is costly in
terms of direct costs, and large ﬁrms are better equipped than small
ﬁrms to bear these costs. Furthermore, large ﬁrms generally have
greater analyst coverage, attract highly skilled employees and have
access to more sophisticated information systems. Prior studies cov-
ering information disclosure have not focused on macroeconomic in-
formation and there is reason to believe that this relationship will be of
even greater importance in this context. Oxelheim et al. (2012a,b) show
that producing the information needed to pursue a macroeconomic risk
management strategy may call for fairly proﬁcient information systems.
Thus, a positive coeﬃcient is expected. The natural logarithm of total
assets is used as a proxy for size.
The agency theory provides an explicit link between corporate
disclosure and the amount of debt present in the capital structure
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The higher the leverage (LEV), the greater
is the need for monitoring in order to alleviate potential agency costs. It
15 An information supply similar to that given in the example in Table 1.
16 Due to data availability problems, ﬁgures from 2010 are used under the assumption
that the variable is rather rigid and this proxy well reﬂects the entire period.
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is often hypothesized that disclosure of voluntary information increases
the monitoring of a ﬁrm (Leftwich, Watts, & Zimmerman, 1981).
However, previous studies have not found conclusive evidence of a
relationship between leverage and the voluntary supply of information
(e.g., Raﬀournier, 1995; Depoers, 2000). Since macroeconomic ex-
posures tend to be volatile and directly aﬀect the ability to service debt
obligations, a positive relationship is expected between leverage and
macroeconomic information disclosure. Total debt scaled by total assets
is used to measure leverage.
A domestic ﬁrm has fewer incentives to supply wide-ranging mac-
roeconomic information, even if exposure to macroeconomic ﬂuctua-
tions is still apparent. However, when operating in several geographical
markets, as measured by greater foreign sales for example, the macro-
economic exposure as well as the information requirements will in-
crease. Raﬀournier (1995) shows, by studying the Swiss market, that
the extent of internationalization – measured as exports over total sales
– is positively related to information disclosure. Cooke (1989), 1992)
supports this hypothesis with evidence from Sweden and Japan – two
markets with highly internationalized ﬁrms. Foreign sales are here
measured as a percentage of total sales (FORS) and expected to be
positively related to the supply of macroeconomic information.
Singhvi and Desai (1971) argue that managers are more prone to
divulge information when proﬁtability is high, as they want to em-
phasize their proﬁciency and justify their remuneration. Weak proﬁt-
ability is associated with less disclosure, they say, as managers will
want to hide the reasons for it. However, they ﬁnd weak evidence for
their hypothesis (see also Cowen, Ferreri, & Parker, 1987). Hence,
previous empirical results are not conclusive regarding this variable. In
dealing with macroeconomic information disclosure, it is also argued
that proﬁtability should be negatively related to disclosure. Previous
studies show that macroeconomic ﬂuctuations make up a large portion
of CEO compensation (Chiu et al., 2016). Therefore, from a macro-
economic information disclosure point of view, ﬁrms are expected to be
less prone to reveal this information when proﬁtability is high as they
may want to conceal the role of pure luck. Proﬁtability (PROF) is
measured as the return on assets.
Capital intensity (CAP_IN) is frequently used as a proxy for entry
barriers. A ﬁrm operating in a protected environment should be more
inclined to provide the capital markets with macroeconomic informa-
tion (Darrough & Stoughton, 1990). Clarkson, Kao, and Richardson,
1994 strengthen this hypothesis with empirical results. They distinguish
between ﬁnancing (valuation) and product market eﬀects (proprietary
costs), and show that the probability that ﬁrms with good (bad) in-
formation will disclose that information decreases (increase) with low
entry barriers. The net of property, plant and equipment (PP&E) scaled
by total assets is used to capture the eﬀect of entry barriers and a po-
sitive relationship is expected.
The last ﬁrm-speciﬁc control variable included in the analysis is a
proxy for the beneﬁts to the capital markets of providing voluntary
information (Scott, 1994). Stock turnover (TURN), measured as total
trading scaled by outstanding shares, is used in the analysis and a po-
sitive coeﬃcient is expected. Table 2 lists all variables, along with their
expected signs and a short explanation of each.
6.5. Methodology
To test the impact of reporting practices, governance systems and
capital markets on information disclosure, along with the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
control variables, a logistic regression is used, where the dependent
variable takes the value 1 if the ﬁrm is graded 3 or higher (in terms of
the information it provides) and 0 otherwise. A random eﬀects model is
not supported by the Hausman test and a ﬁxed eﬀect model eliminates
the explanatory variables. Therefore, a pooled logistic regression model
is used where time-series eﬀects are controlled for by the inclusion of
year dummies. The model is robust to other speciﬁcations and using an
ordered logistic regression provided qualitatively similar results. In the
next section, detailed diagnostics on the regression models are pro-
vided. All four information categories (dependent variables) are tested:
macroeconomic variables, impact, strategies and total. The following
multivariate logistic model is estimated:
Disclosure = β0 + β12003 + β12006 + β12009 + β2ANG + β3NOR
+ β4CAP + β5PROD + β6SIZE + β7LEV + β8FORS + β9PROF +
β10CAP_IN + β11TURN + ε (1)
where Disclosure = macroeconomic variables, impact, strategies, or total,
respectively.
6.6. Descriptive statistics
Since the dependent variables in this study are cumbersome to
construct, an exhaustive descriptive analysis of them is presented be-
fore the empirics of the independent variables are shown. Table 3 shows
the absolute number of ﬁrms graded 3 or higher for each type of de-
pendent variable.
The most striking ﬁnding is that no ﬁrm qualiﬁes for a Category 4
grading. Despite this, the trend in the quality of information supplied is
positive for macroeconomic variables and strategies across the whole
Table 2
Summary of variables, expected signs and deﬁnitions.
Variable Sign Deﬁnition
Dependent Variables
Macroeconomic Variables + The supply of information graded 1 to 4
Impact + The supply of information graded 1 to 4
Strategies + The supply of information graded 1 to 4
Total + The equally weighted average of the above 3
Explanatory Variables
Anglo-Saxon System (ANG) + 1 for Anglo-Saxon, 0 otherwise
Nordic System (NOR) + 1 for Nordic, 0 otherwise
International Cross-listing (CAP) + Number of international markets where stock is listed
Control Variables
Product Type (PROD) + 1 for heterogeneous, 0 for homogeneous
Firm Size (SIZE) + Natural logarithm of total assets
Leverage (LEV) + Total debt to total assets
Foreign Sales (FORS) + Foreign sales to total sales
Proﬁtability (PROF) – Return on assets
Capital Intensity (CAP_IN) + PP&E to total assets
Stock Turnover (TURN) + Trading volume to outstanding shares
Year Dummies (2003, 2006 and 2009) -/+ 1 for 2003, 2006 and 2009, 0 otherwise
Notes: This table presents the variables, their expected eﬀects on the supply of information and their deﬁnitions.
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period, although the quality of total and impact decreased after 2006.
Many ﬁrms have a 3 for macroeconomic variables and strategies in 2009,
96 percent and 80 percent, respectively, which is a clear improvement
over 2000, when the corresponding ﬁgures were 61 percent and 37
percent. Only a moderate number of ﬁrms disclose any impact quanti-
tatively though, just 35 percent in 2009, although that is up on the 16
percent that did so in 2000. This can partly be explained by the fact that
no quantitative analysis (except for the weak requirements of IFRS 7) is
required by IAS 1. The low number of ﬁrms graded 3 across all cate-
gories (the total measure) is, nonetheless, remarkable. In 2009 only 30
percent of the ﬁrms had an average of 3. Again, this is up on the 2000
ﬁgure of 11 percent. Despite these gradual improvements, on average it
is still diﬃcult, and in most cases impossible, for an outsider share-
holder to understand the link between reported proﬁts for a period and
the inﬂuence of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations during the same period
(Category 4), due to an unsatisfactory supply of information from the
ﬁrm.
In Table 4 the changes that occurred between the years of ob-
servation (as well as across the entire period) are presented, for the four
measures of the supply of macroeconomic information (that is, the
dependent variables). The results show that 35 ﬁrms improved their
supply of information on macroeconomic variables between 2000 and
2009. The high degree of disclosure regarding these variables is un-
likely to be due entirely to IAS 1 since, at the beginning of the period, as
many as 61 ﬁrms were already reporting these variables (Category 3 or
higher). However, it is imperative to stress that the information re-
ported to outsiders is still only partial and therefore not “satisfactory”
according to what is deemed so by the deﬁnition gleaned from the
MUST analysis. No ﬁrms present the methodology used to calculate the
variables and therefore it is diﬃcult to know whether exposures such as
those that have emerged from competitors’ strategies, for example, are
accounted for. The explanatory value of the variables presented in the
external reporting must be questioned when there is no speciﬁcation of
the methodology used.
As regards impact, the overall development between 2000 and 2009
is positive: 23 ﬁrms improved their transparency. However, four ﬁrms
actually worsened their reporting practices over the period and the
number of ﬁrms supplying information on the impact actually decreased
between 2006 and 2009. One potential reason for the downward shift
in this particular information category between 2006 and 2009 is that
IFRS 7 was implemented during this period. While the supply of in-
formation has been enhanced in some respects due to IFRS 7 (requiring
a sensitivity analysis of how market risks impact ﬁnancial derivatives),
the new standard may, from the perspective adopted here, in fact have
increased the transparency gap. The downgrading of ﬁrms in 2009
therefore seems to be mainly due to them changing from the partial
sensitivity coeﬃcients to those required by IFRS 7, namely eﬀects
concerning ﬁnancial instruments.
It seems that, in general, ﬁrms are more reluctant to share in-
formation on how big the eﬀects from macroeconomic ﬂuctuations are,
than they are with the other information categories. The weak dis-
closure of impact is in line with Oxelheim (2003), who emphasizes that
the impact measure is the weakest link in the chain. A potential ex-
planation might be that this is due to opportunistic behavior among
insiders. Chiu et al. (2016) ﬁnd persuasive evidence that the size of
compensation and macroeconomic randomness are closely related,
which may inﬂuence the willingness to explicitly provide measures of
this kind, especially since the sensitivity coeﬃcients are central in ﬁl-
tering out macroeconomic distortions from performance.
A total of 46 ﬁrms improved their supply of information on risk
management strategies and 3 worsened theirs. Some of the improve-
ments in accounting standards made during 2000–2009, such as IFRS 7,
are related to either risk management or the instruments utilized in risk
management strategies. Thus, this information category has been af-
fected positively by IFRS 7 and the eﬀects cannot be attributed entirely
to IAS 1. However, an accurate supply of information on risk man-
agement strategies and macroeconomic variables is not of great value if
the impact (sensitivity coeﬃcients to macroeconomic variables) is not
reported. It is crucial for the outside shareholder to be able to assess the
net macroeconomic eﬀect on proﬁts from the macroeconomic variables,
which is not possible unless all of the information categories are re-
ported.
The last information category, total, represents the proportion of
ﬁrms that actually report to at least the Category 3 standard across all
information categories. Overall, 23 companies improved their in-
formation disclosure between 2000 and 2009, while 4 worsened theirs.
A McNemar test of whether the improvements from Categories 1 and 2
to Category 3 are signiﬁcant between 2000/2009, 2000/2003, 2003/
2006 and 2006/2009 is presented in Table 5. The accumulated change
in reporting quality over 2000–2009 is statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level. Moreover, the analysis shows that the changes between
2000/2003 and between 2003/2006 regarding the information cate-
gories, including total, are all signiﬁcant. The only changes that are not
Table 3
Number of Firms Graded 3 (or Higher) in 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009.
Information Type 2000 2003 2006 2009
Macroeconomic Variables 61 75 88 96
Impact 16 28 36 35
Strategies 37 54 78 80
Total 11 23 33 30
Notes: This table compares the dependent variables and how the supply of
macroeconomic information has developed in the time period 2000–2009. Only
ﬁrms graded 3 or higher for the relevant information type in a given year are
included (out of 100 observations per year). The quality of the supply of in-
formation is evaluated by grading the three types of information (collected from
the annual reports) from 1 to 4. These types are the supply of information on
the relevant macroeconomic variables, the impact of these variables and how
risk management strategies aﬀect the exposure. Total is calculated as the
equally weighted average of the three information types.
Table 4
Number of changes between 2000/2009, 2000/2003, 2003/2006 and 2006/
2009.
Information
Type
Status 2000/
2009
2000/
2003
2003/
2006
2006/
2009
Macroeconomic
Variables
Improved 35 19 15 8
Worsened 0 5 2 0
Stayed ≥ 3 61 56 73 88
Stayed< 3 4 20 10 4
Impact Improved 23 14 12 4
Worsened 4 2 4 5
Stayed ≥ 3 12 14 24 31
Stayed< 3 61 70 60 60
Strategies Improved 46 20 25 3
Worsened 3 3 1 1
Stayed ≥ 3 34 34 53 77
Stayed< 3 17 43 21 19
Total Improved 23 14 13 2
Worsened 4 2 3 5
Stayed ≥ 3 7 9 20 28
Stayed< 3 66 75 64 65
Notes: This table compares the dependent variables and how the supply of
macroeconomic information has developed in the time period 2000–2009, as
well as in various sub-periods. The quality of the supply is evaluated by grading
the three types of information (collected from the annual reports) from 1 to 4.
The information types are the supply of information on the relevant macro-
economic variables, the impact of these variables and how risk management
strategies aﬀect the exposure. Total is calculated as the equally weighted
average of these three. A ﬁrm is given the status "Improved" if the supply of
information went from below 3 to 3 or higher between the given years and vice
versa for "Worsened". “Stayed ≥ 3″ indicates that the ﬁrm remained at a high
level of disclosure and vice versa for “Stayed< 3″.
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statistically signiﬁcant are those that occurred between 2006 and 2009
regarding impact, strategies and total. Hence, the bulk of the signiﬁcant
changes took place before 2006.
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the independent variables,
divided into explanatory and control variables (excluding the time
dummy variables). As can be seen, 17 percent of the sample consists of
ﬁrms under Anglo-Saxon, 17 percent under Nordic and the residual 66
percent under Germanic corporate governance systems. The ﬁrms are,
on average, listed on nine stock exchanges. Further, the ﬁrms typically
have heterogeneous products and are of a similar size. They are, on
average, lightly leveraged and highly internationalized (based on for-
eign sales over total sales). The proﬁtability is near the long-term
average and capital intensity is rather low for many of the ﬁrms. The
stock turnover is dispersed, with a large standard deviation.
7. Empirical results
7.1. Bivariate analysis
The correlation matrix in Table 7 indicates there are no multi-
collinearity problems in the speciﬁcation and a majority of correlations
between the dependent and explanatory variables have the expected
signs. In addition, a variance inﬂation factor (VIF) test on the in-
dependent variables indicates there are no multicollinearity problems.
All variables have VIFs below 217.
7.2. Multivariate analysis
Table 8 presents the logistic regression models 1–4, where the de-
pendent variables are respectively the three information categories –
macroeconomic variables, impact and strategy – and total (the equally
weighted average of the other three). The analysis below refers to the
total disclosure measure unless otherwise indicated.
The three explanatory variables – IFRS development, corporate
governance systems and international cross-listing – are all found sta-
tistically signiﬁcant with the predicted signs. Hence, all three null hy-
potheses stating no relationship can be rejected. Signiﬁcant statistical
support is found for a positive inﬂuence from all three explanatory
institutional variables on the propensity of the ﬁrm to supply in-
formation on the impact of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations on corporate
performance, of the kind demanded by the outsider shareholder.
Divergent patterns are found regarding the role of IFRS develop-
ment (2003 DUMMY, 2006 DUMMY, 2009 DUMMY) on the quality of
macroeconomic information supplied. For all three individual levels, a
gradual upgrading as a result of the IFRS is found, whereas for the total
quality there is no signiﬁcant eﬀect until 2009. One interpretation of
this is that it takes time, when companies have degrees of freedom in
their disclosure practice, to have the three quality elements match each
other in a consistent way, leading to higher total information quality.
The IFRS time dummies point to a positive trend in the quality of the
disclosed information. Caution is advocated in the interpretation of the
role of IFRS, since this may simply reﬂect a general trend towards in-
creased transparency (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2015).
The Anglo-Saxon dummy is robust for all four dependent variables,
and indicates that ﬁrms in market-driven governance systems are more
likely to disclose a higher quality of macroeconomic information of the
kind demanded by outside shareholders in countries adopting an Anglo-
Saxon corporate governance regime. The dummy variable representing
the Nordic corporate governance regime is signiﬁcant in all models
except the ﬁrst (when macroeconomic variables is the dependent vari-
able), which is a fairly consistent pattern. The weakest system in terms
of the supply to outside shareholders of relevant information on mac-
roeconomic inﬂuences on proﬁts is, in accordance with the discussion
in Section 2, the Germanic system (the base case in the regression). The
results indicate that IFRS in its current form of vague recommendations
is beneﬁtting from reinforcing structures, allowing satisfactory levels of
macroeconomic information to be supplied, which corroborates the
ideas of Ball (2006). This adds a previously unexplored dimension – a
macroeconomic dimension – to the research on recommended or vo-
luntary supply of information (Ball et al., 2003; Daske et al., 2008; Leuz
et al., 2003; Brüggeman et al., 2013).
For the third explanatory variable – international cross-listing (CAP)
– a signiﬁcantly positive relationship with the quality of macro-
economic information supplied is found. In Table 8, the variable is
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, and ﬁrms driven by cross-border ca-
pital market requirements are more prone to supplying macroeconomic
information. Meek and Gray (1989) and Khanna et al. (2004) found
cross-listing to be positively related to the supply of information and,
again, the current results add a macroeconomic angle to this stream of
research.
When it comes to the control variables, only two variables are found
to have a signiﬁcant impact on the propensity to disclose macro-
economic information (as measured by the dependent variable total):
leverage (LEV) and capital intensity (CAP_IN). In contrast to
Raﬀournier (1995) and Leuz (2004), leverage is found to be statistically
signiﬁcantly and positively related to the propensity to disclose in-
formation. This seems very logical given that providing voluntary in-
formation increases the monitoring of a ﬁrm (Leftwich et al., 1981).
Given the major impact of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations on net income,
voluntary information supply of this kind should reduce the uncertainty
for creditors. A high proportion of debt in the capital structure yields a
higher ﬁnancial risk and means that a relatively greater proportion of
Table 5
McNemar test of asymmetries.
Category changes Variables Impact Strategies Total
Change 00/09 35.00*** 13.37*** 37.73*** 13.37***
Change 00/03 8.17*** 9.00*** 12.57*** 9.00***
Change 03/06 9.94*** 4.00* 22.15*** 6.25**
Change 06/09 8.00*** 0.11 1.00 1.28
Notes: This table shows the Stuart-Maxwell statistics and the statistical sig-
niﬁcance in the form of a McNemar test for improvements from Categories 1
and 2 to Category 3 in 2000–2009, as well as in sub-periods. The quality of the
supply of information is evaluated by grading three information categories
(collected from annual reports) from 1 to 4: information on the relevant mac-
roeconomic variables, the impact of these variables and how risk management
strategies aﬀect the exposure. Total is calculated as the equally weighted
average of the three. Signiﬁcance levels: ***= 0.01, **= 0.05, *= 0.10.
Table 6
Descriptive statistics for independent variables.
Independent Variables Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev.
Explanatory Variables
Anglo-Saxon System (ANG) 0.18 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.37
Nordic System (NOR) 0.17 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.38
International Cross-listing (CAP) 9.17 10.00 14.00 1.00 2.71
Control Variables
Product Type (PROD) 0.80 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.40
Firm Size (SIZE) 7.35 7.33 8.38 6.04 0.43
Leverage (LEV) 0.28 0.27 1.23 0.00 0.15
Foreign Sales (FORS) 0.60 0.62 0.99 0.00 0.28
Proﬁtability (PROF) 0.07 0.06 0.32 −0.16 0.06
Capital Intensity (CAP_IN) 0.32 0.31 0.83 0.00 0.18
Stock Turnover (TURN) 0.97 0.85 14.17 0.00 1.12
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the independent variables. See
Table 2 for deﬁnitions of the variables.
17 Though this test is commonly used, there is still a debate about what is a proper
critical value to use. However, recommendations in the literature ﬂuctuate between 4 and
10. Hence, regardless of which of these values were used, the reported values would
indicate no problem of multicollinearity.
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Table 8
Logistic regressions with year dummies.
Independent Variables (1) Macro-economic
variables
(2) Impact (3) Strategies (4) Total
Constant 7.69** −8.06*** −1.22 0.76
(2.10) (−2.59) (−0.41) (0.22)
Product Type (PROD) −0.31 0.10 −0.80** −0.24
(−0.68) (0.26) (−2.04) (−0.58)
Size (SIZE) −1.15** 0.54 −0.14 −0.28
(−2.22) (1.30) (−0.33) (−0.60)
Leverage (LEV) 0.90 0.71 2.03** 2.01*
(0.74) (0.80) (2.06) (1.69)
Foreign Sales (FORS) 2.43*** 0.77 0.89* 0.30
(3.54) (1.54) (1.68) (0.50)
Proﬁtability (PROF) −4.04 3.13 1.15 4.71
(−1.26) (1.28) (0.45) (1.46)
Capital Intensity (CAP_IN) −1.56 0.14 −3.14*** −2.42**
(−1.36) (0.16) (−3.47) (−2.36)
Stock Turnover (TURN) −0.05 0.00 0.15 0.23
(-0.37) (0.02) (1.04) (1.31)
Anglo-Saxon System (ANG) 2.97*** 0.72* 1.47*** 0.97**
(3.52) (1.87) (3.49) (2.06)
Nordic System (NOR) 0.78 1.84*** 1.40*** 0.80*
(1.64) (5.20) (3.67) (1.84)
International Cross-listing (CAP) 0.03 0.10 0.17*** 0.19***
(0.37) (1.52) (2.82) (2.98)
2003 Dummy (2003) 0.79** 0.82** 0.83** 0.48
(2.17) (2.14) (2.55) (1.33)
2006 Dummy (2006) 1.84*** 1.11*** 1.97*** 0.63
(4.34) (2.97) (5.41) (1.63)
2009 Dummy (2009) 2.85*** 1.06*** 2.03*** 1.34***
(4.81) (2.77) (5.45) (3.04)
Number of observations 378 378 378 378
LR chi2(11) 87.10 52.44 92.74 34.72
Probability > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.11 0.19 0.10
Log Likelihood −141.94 −205.19 −202.79 −165.23
Linktest (Probability) 0.66 0.71 0.30 0.16
Goodness-of-ﬁt (Pearson) 0.10 0.32 0.28 0.68
Goodness-of-ﬁt (HosmerLemeshow) 0.27 0.92 0.29 0.54
Notes: The dependent variables (macroeconomic variables, impact and strategy) in the table are the measures of quality/quantity of the supply of macroeconomic
information (top row) collected from annual reports and graded from 1 to 4. The measures relate to the supply of information on the relevant macroeconomic
variables, the impact of these variables and how risk management strategies aﬀect the exposure. A ﬁrm with a grading greater than or equal to 3 is assigned 1, others
are assigned 0. The last dependent variable, total, is calculated as the equally weighted average of the other three. Again, ﬁrms are assigned 1 if the average is greater
than or equal to 3. See Table 2 for deﬁnitions of the variables. Signiﬁcance levels: ***=0.01, **=0.05, *= 0.10.
Table 7
Pearson correlation matrix and VIF test.
Variables VAR IMP STR TOT ANG NOR CAP PROD SIZE LEV FORS PROF CAP_IN TURN
VAR 1
IMP 0.249*** 1
STR 0.552*** 0.29*** 1
TOT 0.283*** 0.89*** 0.44*** 1
ANG 0.193*** 0.01 0.08 −0.02 1
NOR 0.06 0.26*** 0.11** 0.29*** −0.21*** 1
CAP −0.11** 0.07 0.09* 0.04 −0.35*** −0.07 1
PROD 0.13* 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.16*** −0.04 0.04 1
SIZE −0.05 0.08 0.12** 0.07 −0.05 −0.26*** 0.44*** −0.19*** 1
LEV −0.01 0.01 0.02 −0.03 −0.01 −0.12** −0.04 0.08 0.13** 1
FORS 0.22*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.03 0.14*** 0.04 0.20*** 0.05 −0.14*** 1
PROF −0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.13*** −0.04 0.03 −0.37*** −0.22*** 0.02 1
CAP_IN −0.13** 0.03 −0.17*** −0.03 −0.07 0.17*** −0.02 −0.46*** −0.03 0.18*** −0.39*** −0.02 1
TURN −0.03 −0.02 0.05 −0.03 −0.10** −0.07 0.03 −0.07 −0.03 −0.04 0.01 0.05 −0.01 1
VIF test – – – – 1.39 1.25 1.72 1.57 1.77 1.14 1.26 1.14 1.62 1.04
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gross proﬁts must be used to service the interest payments.18
Capital intensity (CAP_IN) is statistically signiﬁcantly but negatively
related to the propensity to supply macroeconomic information. This
result is counter to the expectations derived from the model of
Darrough and Stoughton (1990) and the empirical results from
Clarkson et al. (1994). It suggests that the probability of supplying re-
levant macroeconomic information is higher when the threat of entry is
high than when the threat is low. This may reﬂect that ﬁrms in a pro-
tected environment supply information in order to maximize valuation,
since product market concerns are less of an issue. It can also be argued
that, when the macroeconomy aﬀects a ﬁrm positively, there are
managerial incentives to conceal the positive eﬀects. Hence, a ﬁrm in a
low-competition environment has no incentives to supply macro-
economic information since, in this case, the managers’ incentives to
keep potential entrants in the dark win out.
8. Conclusions
The concept of transparency has attracted interest in the research
literature for only a few decades (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2006). The
focus has been on the supply of information, with the implicit as-
sumption that more information means a higher level of transparency.
More recent research has stressed that more information also means
higher processing costs for both sender and receiver, thereby ac-
knowledging the importance of identifying what is seen as relevant
information by the receiver (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2015). This paper
emphasizes the demand side of information in terms of satisfactory
transparency, and analyzes how the supply side meets the demand in
order to eliminate an existing information asymmetry.
The point of departure is the demand from the outsider shareholder
for information that will help him or her to comprehend how proﬁts
have actually developed, i.e. after temporary eﬀects from the macro-
economic environment of the ﬁrm have been ﬁltered out. The globali-
zation of ﬁrms’ commercial and ﬁnancial operations, in combination
with increased ﬁnancial market integration, should have increased
shareholders’ need for information on these variables. However, this is
neither reﬂected in the research nor in the real world, where most
companies still (as a best case) only supply the result of a static com-
parison between the value based on exchange rates at the start of the
period, and the value based on those at the end of the period. The re-
search question of this paper has been to analyze and conclude to what
extent domestic (via the corporate governance system and accounting
rules of the country where the ﬁrm is headquartered) and international
(transmitted via cross-listing) institutional forces may put pressure on
an individual ﬁrm to supply more relevant information and thereby
come closer to what is deemed “satisfactory” transparency by the
shareholder, with a resulting reduction in any potential information
asymmetry.
The potential information asymmetry may have many explanations,
such as (1) avoiding a supply of information that may reach competi-
tors, leading to a negative impact on the ﬁrm’s own competitiveness
and thereby creating a visible gap between a satisfactory level of
transparency for the shareholder and optimal transparency for the ﬁrm,
(2) ignorance as a result of inferior integration between economics and
business education at the university level, (3) resignation by manage-
ment and a feeling that it is too complicated, (4) moral hazard and
management’s interest in using this kind of information to its own ad-
vantage, and (5) the eﬀects being imagined to be too small. The ﬁrst
explanation may be valid in the context of ﬁnding an optimal trans-
parency for the ﬁrm, whereby it avoids releasing information that may
cost it more than what the shareholders will charge for not getting it.
The remaining four explanations may have some explanatory value at
the ﬁrm level, motivating this study of the degree to which institutional
factors may inﬂuence a ﬁrm’s propensity to supply high-quality mac-
roeconomic information of a kind deemed satisfactory by the outside
shareholder, in that it enables him or her to calculate the prospects of
the ﬁrm under diﬀerent scenarios.
Based on a sample of the 100 largest public European ﬁrms from
2000 to 2009, a positive trend is found as regards an increased supply
of relevant information, i.e. a narrowing of the transparency gap.
Despite this positive trend in the quality of the supply of information,
none of the 100 ﬁrms supplied information that could be graded as
“satisfactory” from the shareholders’ perspective, which would require
a speciﬁcation of the most important macroeconomic variables, vul-
nerability coeﬃcients estimated from a multivariate framework using
these variables, and given as sensitivity coeﬃcients, and the risk
management strategies used to handle the exposures. The classiﬁcation
is normative, containing some elements of discretion, but even so the
result sends a signal that institutional improvements may be called for.
The institutional factors – IFRS development, the corporate gov-
ernance system and international cross-listing – are all found, as hy-
pothesized, to be positively linked to the narrowing of the transparency
gap. The propensity to supply information deemed satisfactory by
outside shareholders is found to be highest among ﬁrms in countries
with the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance regime, followed by ﬁrms
in the Nordic-regime countries. As hypothesized, the highest transpar-
ency gap as regards the impact on corporate proﬁts from macro-
economic variables is found for ﬁrms in the Germanic corporate gov-
ernance system. The IFRS recommendations seem to beneﬁt from this
supporting institutional mechanism. This adds a new angle to the
stream of research examining the supply of information in relation to
corporate governance systems (Ball et al., 2003; Daske et al., 2008; Leuz
et al., 2003). Further, the strong evidence that international cross-
listing is narrowing the transparency gap in the case of macroeconomic
information, adds another aspect to the ﬁndings of Khanna et al.
(2004). This eﬀect is further strengthened by the statistically signiﬁcant
positive relationship between leverage and the supply of information.
If outsider shareholders cannot determine intrinsic performance,
ﬁrms will experience a higher cost of capital, as theoretically estab-
lished by Lambert et al. (2007) and in an IFRS context indirectly by
Daske et al. (2008). The fact that all ﬁrms investigated fall below the
“satisfactory” level may indicate a less than optimal aggregate trans-
parency and that improvements remain to be made. From a national
economic growth perspective an “excessive” transparency gap may,
from a long-term perspective, lead to lower prosperity through a higher
cost of capital and decreasing investment rates. From a government
point of view, it may be tempting to impose rules to make the supply of
“satisfactory” information (with quantitative measures in line with
Table 1) mandatory. However, this could also hit those ﬁrms that – due
to the risk of revealing information that may harm their competitive-
ness – ﬁnd the cost of this harm to exceed the cost (increased risk
premium) charged by the outside shareholder for not getting the in-
formation. In other words, it will also hit the ﬁrm that has a well-mo-
tivated gap between its optimal transparency and the outside share-
holders’ satisfactory transparency. The indirect inﬂuence from
supporting institutional factors reported here may do some of the work
and thereby help avoid the need to make the “satisfactory” information
release mandatory.
Further research should be devoted to the role played by the ﬁve
diﬀerent explanations (presented earlier in this section) for manage-
ment’s choice not to supply information deemed necessary to satisfy the
need from outsider shareholders for their investment decisions but also
from other external stakeholders like bankers as support for their de-
cision to grant new loans or extend old ones. For example, in this
context the role of managements’ incentive programs for the release of
satisfactory information to external shareholders needs to be studied.
Further research is also motivated on how the cost of capital of the
ﬁrm is impacted by such a choice of not to reveal relevant information.
18 It is important to note, though, that creditors are a part of the capital markets and
the variable also captures this aspect.
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Finally, in the empirical analysis of this paper, the timing of the in-
troduction of IFRS played a role in the choice of the period investigated.
Further research should – with relevance for the policy-making process
– analyze whether institutions also have an inﬂuence on the ﬁrm’s
propensity to meet the demand for information from outside share-
holders, of the same kind and magnitude as reported here, in a period of
ﬁnancial crisis, such as the period after the Lehman crisis of 2008.
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Appendix A
Industry Distribution
Industry Number of Firms Percentage of Sample
Aerospace and Defense 4 4
Business Services and Supplies 1 1
Capital Goods 9 9
Chemicals 3 3
Conglomerates 4 4
Construction 7 7
Consumer Durables 6 6
Drugs and Biotechnology 5 5
Food, Drink and Tobacco 9 9
Food Markets 4 4
Household and Personal Products 4 4
Materials 3 3
Media 4 4
Oil and Gas Operations 9 9
Retailing 3 3
Software and Services 1 1
Telecommunications Services 9 9
Transportation 6 6
Utilities 9 9
Total 100 100
Geographical Distribution
Country Company CG regime
1 Netherlands Royal Dutch Shell G
2 United Kingdom BP A
3 France Total G
4 Spain Telefónica G
5 Germany E.ON G
6 Germany DaimlerChrysler G
7 Switzerland Nestlé G
8 France France Telecom G
9 France Sanoﬁ-aventis G
10 Germany RWE Group G
11 Switzerland Roche Holding G
12 Norway Statoil Group N
13 Germany Deutsche Post G
14 Italy Telecom Italia G
15 United Kingdom/Netherlands Unilever A
16 Germany BASF G
17 Italy ENEL G
18 France Carrefour Group G
19 Spain Repsol-YPF G
20 France Renault G
21 Netherlands Royal Philips Electronics G
22 Germany BMW-Bayerische Motor G
23 United Kingdom Tesco A
24 United Kingdom AstraZeneca A
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25 France Vivendi G
26 Denmark Möller-Maersk N
27 United Kingdom BT Group A
28 Netherlands EADS G
29 Italy Fiat Group G
30 Norway Norsk Hydro N
31 Germany ThyssenKrupp Group G
32 France Saint-Gobain G
33 Sweden Volvo Group N
34 United Kingdom BAE Systems A
35 Netherlands Schlumberger G
36 Spain Iberdrola G
37 Belgium InBev G
38 United Kingdom Diageo A
39 Switzerland ABB G
40 Sweden TeliaSonera Group N
41 Norway Telenor N
42 France Groupe Danone G
43 France Veolia Environnement G
44 Spain Grupo Ferrovial G
45 Ireland CRH A
46 France Schneider Electric G
47 Germany Metro AG G
48 Switzerland Holcim G
49 Germany EnBW-Energie Baden G
50 Portugal EDP-Energias de Portugal G
51 France Christian Dior G
52 Germany SAP G
53 United Kingdom Rolls-Royce Group A
54 Austria OMV Group G
55 France PPR G
56 Germany Henkel Group G
57 Germany Continental G
58 United Kingdom Wolseley A
59 United Kingdom WPP A
60 Spain Gas Natural SDG G
61 Spain Cepsa G
62 United Kingdom/Netherlands Reed Elsevier A
63 United Kingdom Vodafone A
64 France Michelin Group G
65 Finland Stora Enso N
66 Spain Acciona G
67 Finland Fortum N
68 France Pernod Ricard G
69 Sweden Ericsson N
70 United Kingdom British Airways A
71 Sweden SCA-Svenska Cellulosa N
72 Germany Deutsche Lufthansa G
73 Germany MAN G
74 Portugal Portugal Telecom G
75 United Kingdom Imperial Tobacco Group A
76 Germany Siemens G
77 Netherlands Heineken Holding G
78 United Kingdom Marks & Spencer A
79 Belgium Solvay Group G
80 Spain Sacyr Vallehermoso G
81 Norway Orkla N
82 Switzerland Adecco G
83 Germany Bayer G
84 Sweden Sandvik N
85 Sweden Scania N
86 Italy Finmeccanica G
87 Switzerland Swisscom G
88 Germany Merck G
89 Germany Linde G
90 Finland UPM-Kymmene N
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91 Sweden Atlas Copco N
92 Netherlands TNT G
93 Sweden H&M Hennes & Mauritz N
94 Switzerland Richemont G
95 United Kingdom Pearson A
96 Netherlands Ahold G
97 Denmark Novo Nordisk N
98 Hungary MOL G
99 Germany HeidelbergCement G
100 Spain Abertis G
Notes: This table presents the industry distribution for the sample.
A=Anglo-Saxon corporate governance regime
G=Germanic (or continental European) corporate governance regime
N=Nordic corporate governance regime
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